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LEGAL FEES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-AN "ORDINARY AND
NECESSARY" BUSINESS EXPENSE?
Taxpayer, a securities dealer, was tried and convicted of mail fraud1
and of fraud under the 1933 Securities Act, - and conspiracy to violate
these statutes.' Thereafter he claimed a tax deduction for legal costs
incurred in his defense under the "ordinary and necessary" business
expense provision in section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner, and this ruling was
sustained by the Tax Court. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. Held: Public policy does not preclude the deduction of legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense
arising out of, proximately connected with, and required in the conduct
of a trade or business. Tellier v. Commissioner,342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3118 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1965) (No. 351).
The Internal Revenue Code was initially framed in 1913 with a
purpose to "tax a man's net income" rather than "to reform men's
moral characters." ' Eleven years later the Board of Tax Appeals
observed that it was not "in the interest of sound public policy that the
commission of illegal acts should be so far protected or recognized that
their cost is regarded as a legitimate and proper deduction ...."
Although this dictum was subsequently approved by many courts, the
original purpose of the business expense section was reaffirmed by
Congress in 1951 when a proposal disallowing expenses resulting from
illegal gambling was rejected on the ground that the Code was not
intended to penalize or prohibit unlawful activities.' Again in 1954
Congress rejected a proposal which would have codified the disallowance rule.' Subsequent to a 1958 Supreme Court decision allowing
deduction of lawful expenses of an unlawful business, the Justice
118

U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).

2 Ch. 38, tit. I, § 17, 48 Stat. 84; as amended Act of Aug. 10, 1954, ch. 667, tit. I,
§ 10, 68 Stat. 686; 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
3 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
4 50 CONG. REC. 3849 (1913) (remarks by Senator Williams).
5 Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214, 217 (1924). This appears to be the earliest expression in the United States of public policy considerations in connection with the business
expense provision. An earlier appearance of the doctrine was expressed in Great
Britain in Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Warnes & Co., 2 K.B. 444 (1919).
697 CONG. REc. 12230-44
(1951)
(debate on amendment proposed by Senator
Kefauver).
7 See Comments, ALI FED. INCOME TAx STAT. § X 154(i) 282-86 (May 1952
Draft).
sCommissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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Department recommended to Congress a bill disallowing expenses
incurred by businesses violating state or federal statutes.9 It was not
accepted. Although a provision was added in 1960 to section 16210
disallowing unlawful payments made to officials or employees of
foreign governments, this proviso was justified on foreign policy
grounds. Moreover, its limited scope negates interpretation as Congressional indorsement of a broad public policy sanction 11
In finding that legal costs were deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses, the court in the principal case faced the traditional argument
that since it was neither "ordinary" nor "necessary" to operate a
business unlawfully, it was unnecessary to incur legal fees. The court
cited Commissioner v. Heininger" to rebut this contention, but Heininger may be distinguished because it was a civil action. The fact that
Heininger was a civil case was not persuasive to the court in the
principal case, and it expressly refused "to continue to draw any
distinction in deductibility between civil and criminal cases or between
successful and unsuccessful defenses."'" The court in Tellier found
an expense to be "ordinary and necessary" if it was a required outlay
and arose out of the taxpayer's business. This approach parallels the
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Kornhauser v. United
States," in which legal fees directly connected to or proximately resulting from business activities were held to be "ordinary and necessary" expenses. In adopting this view, the court in the principal case
rejected a line of authority under which legal expenses arising out of
0

H.R. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).

10 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(c).
"1See Comment, 72 YAE L. 108, 111 n.15 (1962).
U.S. 467 (1943). Applicable language in Heininger includes:
It is plain that respondent's legal expenses were both "ordinary and necessary" if
these words be given their commonly accepted meaning. For respondent to employ a lawyer to defend his business from threatened destruction was "normal";
it was the response ordinarily to be expected.... [T]he expenses incurred in
defending the business can also be assumed appropriate and helpful, and therefore

12320

"necessary"...

It has never been thought ... that the mere fact that an expendi-

ture bears a remote relation to an illegal act makes it non-deductible.
Id. at 471, 474. See Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 92 (1960) for discussion of Heiningers
effect upon the deductibility of legal fees in unsuccessful criminal defenses connected
with business activities.
13 Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 695 (1965). Commentators who believe
that Heiningerapplies to criminal. as well as civil cases, for example, are J. Miller,
Deductibility of Penalties,Damages, and Counsel Fees in Cases Involzing Violations
of Non-Tax Laws, N.Y.U. 8th INsT. ON FED. TAx 1286, 1291-92 (1950) ; H. Smith,
Deductions by Corporations of Expenses of Litigation in; Their Defense of Alleged

Anti-Trust Violations, N.Y.U. 8THx

INST.

ON FED. TAx 646, 650 (1950).

Holding

Heininger to apply only to civil suits are Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94

(5th Cir. 1956); Longhorn Portland Cement, 3 T.C. 310 (1944), rev'd on other
groutds, 148 F2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1954).
'4276 U.S. 145 (1928).
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activities deemed contrary to public policy were put in the same
category as non-deductible penalty assessments. 5 The effect of
Tellier is to focus attention on the relationship of the expense to the
business, without regard to collateral policy considerations.
The argument against allowing deduction of legal costs arising out
of a statutory violation is that the deduction frustrates public policy
by taking some of the "sting" out of the statutory penalty. This view
was previously indorsed by the Second Circuit in Burroughs Bldg.
Material Co. v. Commissioner in its conclusion that "if the fines and
costs cannot be deducted the legal expenses... should naturally fall
with the fines themselves."' 6 However, an important distinction
between fines and fees was overlooked in arriving at that conclusion.
The amount of a fine, in theory, represents an appropriate exaction for
unlawful conduct. Although disallowing its deduction may be necessary to sustain its punitive value, 7 legal costs are of no concern to
penal law; their disallowance, therefore, invokes an additional penalty
unassociated with the statutory violation. Since the taxpayer in the
principal case made no attempt to deduct the fine assessed, the statutory policy considerations were satisfied even though the court held the
legal expenses to be deductible.
As a general proposition, absent public policy problems, there is
little theoretical difficulty in finding a business expense to be "ordinary and necessary."' 8 The Supreme Court in Lilly v. Commissioner9
recognized that an otherwise "ordinary and necessary" expense may
be disallowed if "sharply defined national or state policies" would be
frustrated: "the policies frustrated must be national or state policies
evidenced by some governmental declaration.... 2" In Lilly the
15 The most authoritative support for this categorization comes from the Second
Circuit itself, in Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1931). Since a resolution of the issue in the principal case in favor of the taxpayer would require a categorical overruling of Burroughs, the Second Circuit considered this appeal.
26 Id. at 180.
17 A counter-argument is that disallowance of deductions for fines or penalties
increases the burden of the fine by the amount of the additional tax liability, and since
the tax authorities are neutral toward the source of income they should also be neutral
toward reduction of penalties. In Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F2d
711 (2d Cir. 1949), the court permitted deduction of a penalty on the ground that a
disallowance amounted to an additional sanction unwarranted by the statute violated.
But cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
18 A broad interpretation is given "ordinary and necessary" since a strict construction would place the courts in the position of reviewing the taxpayer's business
decisions-a consideration better suited to business efficiency experts. However, the
taxpayer must get by the strict public policy interpretation obstacle before receiving
the benefit of this liberal construction.
19 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
20 Id. at 97. (emphasis added.)
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Commissioner had disallowed deductions for kickback payments by
opticians to doctors for eyeglasses prescribed by the doctors. On
appeal, the Court held such payments to be deductible because there
was no clear evidence of a contrary public policy. In the principal
case no clear evidence of a public policy forbidding the hiring of
counsel was found, and indeed the validity of such a policy would be
doubtful in light of the recent development of the sixth amendment
right to counsel."
A question is raised whether the "right to counsel" argument is
applicable in the principal case, since counsel had already been employed and paid. The effect of disallowing deduction of the legal costs
would be to penalize the taxpayer for exercising his right, rather than
to deny it. In any event, it is clear that there is no valid policy against
employing counsel. Under Lilly this fact would seem to require allowance of a deduction for legal fees.
The holding in Commissioner v. Sullivan2 2 lends further support to
the conclusion reached in the principal case. In Sullivan the Supreme
Court permitted rents and wages paid in connection with an illegal
gambling business to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. If rents and wages expended in connection with an
illegal business are deductible, a fortiori legal costs in connection with
such a business should be deductible.
It has also been argued that, if legal expenses are deductible, taxpayers (particularly ones in high income brackets) will be encouraged
to spend large sums in opposing governmental actions. This conviction
was expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Jerry Rossman Corp. v.
Commissioner.2 3 Judge Hand stated that to permit a deduction would
be to "subsidize the obduracy of those offenders who were unwilling
to pay without a contest and who therefore added impenitence to their
offense; and for this reason... we held that such legal expenses were
never deductible." 4 To this argument is added the fact that increased
litigation results in protracted trials, higher costs of investigation, and
21 It was proper for the court in the principal case to consider a disallowance of
legal fees in connection with a policy against the sixth amendment right to counsel, as

the policies expressed by the statutes violated were satisfied by payment of nondeductible fines. See also, Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12
TAx L. REv. 241, 266-68 (1957); Krassner, Cat a Deduction for Legal Fees Be

Aganst Public Policy?, 26 TAXES 447 (1948).
22 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
23175 F2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
24 Id. at 713. This statement was made in discussion of the scope of the Heininger
decision, which was considered to overrule the non-deductibility-of-legal-costs doctrine
previously accepted by the Second Circuit.
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greater demands upon governmental personnel. These arguments are
vulnerable. The fear of increased litigation would be as great in civil
actions as criminal, yet the current rule disallowing deductions applies
only to criminal cases. Also, the further refinement of allowing legal
expenses only if the defense was successful puts a premium on winning
which contributes to extended litigation.
The court in the principal case justified its decision to abolish all
distinctions between civil and criminal, and successful and unsuccessful, defenses partially on the basis that the former rule results in arbitrary, artificial, and conflicting decisions. This argument is sound
when one considers that, for example, a taxpayer who pleads nolo
contendere may not deduct his legal expenses,25 but the legal expenses
leading to an out of court settlement may be deducted.26
Is the broad rule adopted by this court desirable? This question has
particular significance when it is considered that few criminal violations raise as little public ire as the conviction in the principal case.
Should a convicted dope peddler, for example, be permitted to deduct
his legal expenses from income derived from narcotic sales? Should
a subjective test have been adopted instead? One measure of public
sentiment is the penalty assessed for given acts; consequently, it is the
legislature's duty to maintain acceptable penal standards. If the
maximum penalty for dope peddling is insufficient, it should be
increased directly by legislation. Disallowing legal fees effects an
additional indirect penalty which has no connection with the statutory
policy or public sentiment. The court in the principal case properly
ascertained the different functions of penalties and legal fees, and put
them in separate categories. This separation should apply regardless
of the particular criminal act involved.
In removing the legal costs of unsuccessful criminal defenses from
the category of monetary penalties, the court in the principal case
exhibited due regard for reason as well as precedent. It is to be hoped
that the analysis will have an early acceptance by the other circuits,
which now uniformly adhere to the old rule."
25
Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Standard Coat, Apron &
Linen Serv., Inc., 40 T.C. 858 (1963).
26 Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956); Greene Motor Co.,
5 T.C. 314 (1945); Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 360 (1944).
27 Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Fihe v. Commissioner, 265
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958);
Estate of MacCrowe, 240 F2d 841 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Port v. United States, 143 Ct.
Cl. 334, 163 F. Supp. 645 (1958).

